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new consensus (p. 311). 
There are ironies in a collection of essays on 
critical theory designed for a U.S. audience. 
The ideas suffer more than a sea change as one 
reads that Consumer Reports represents a 
critical negation of mass advertising, with no 
recognition that the consumer project is more 
rationally enhanced by the presence of such 
reports. There is irony also in the critical 
analysis of the Head Start program. While it 
reveals the broader horizons possible for the 
culturally deprived, little is made of the legiti- 
mation function served by Head Start, and 
there is no "critique" of the social reproduction 
of capitalism that takes place in the midst of 
this and similar programs. Perhaps Adorno 
was ultimately right when he argued that the 
only posture for critical theory is negation 
without resolution. For, in the post industrial 
age, it seems that a positive or practical appli- 
cation of critical theory may lead uninten- 
tionally to a new form of legitimation. The 
essays in this volume inadvertently pose that 




Between Philosophy and Politics: The Aliena- 
tion of Political Theory. By John G. Gun- 
nell (Amherst: University of Massachusetts 
Press, 1986. 240p. $25.00, cloth; $12.95, 
paper). 
This trenchant work provides a "synthesis, 
clarification, and elaboration" of arguments 
made elsewhere by Gunnell alleging the 
"alienation" of academic political theory (p. 
iW). Not the first to suggest that dominant prac- 
tices in this field are forms of intellectual 
masturbation, Gunnell nonetheless presses this 
central point with considerable zeal and with a 
delightfully acid tongue. He is thereby sure to 
provoke contention if not the "transforma- 
tion" he desires. 
Transforming the field requires an under- 
standing of its present-day ills. Hence, the first 
chapter offers a reconstruction of the intel- 
lectual development (or rather devolution) of 
the field over the last three decades in order to 
identify a variety of historical forces that in 
turn help account for the underlying cause of 
the alienation of political theory today: its 
entrapment in and by philosophical and meta- 
theoretical discourse, or "its absorption with 
metatheory" (p. 154), or (more creatively) its 
"philosophization" (pp. 28, 31). 
This dreaded disease engenders in political 
theory a distorted and pretentious self-image. 
Symptoms include the following: the subject is 
ensnared in myths (identified on pp. 1 and 
194); is unreflective about its parasitic relation- 
ship to "the transcendental and epistemo- 
logical traditions in philosophy which ... are 
themselves alienated enterprises" (p. 4); and is 
unable to achieve an authentic appreciation of 
its actual relationships to politics and political 
inquiry. Though fruitful relationships are vir- 
tually nonexistent, most theorists believe, or 
pretend to believe, that their estranged and 
rarified discourse provides authoritative stand- 
ards, foundations, and illumination for both 
political practice and political inquiry, and on 
which, therefore, both are or ought to be 
dependent. They even believe, or make 
believe, that much of this discourse, being in 
some (distant) way about politics, is itself 
political. 
These illusions and delusions serve a variety 
of purposes, but foremost among them is, of 
course, the bolstering of self-image and of the 
conviction that all this talk-about epistemol- 
ogy, methodology, explanation, and interpre- 
tation; about metaethics, normative founda- 
tions, and facts and values; about the universal 
dilemmas, fundamental concepts, and philo- 
sophical dimensions of politics; about his- 
toriography, hermeneutics, and the great 
tradition of epic theorists-actually constitutes 
an authoritative script for inquiry and an 
authoritative and authentic "theoretical and 
practical engagement of politics" (p. 138). 
How might the patient be cured? Academic 
theory "redeemed"? Discourse "transformed"? 
Two prescriptions eem crucial. First, theorists 
must come to recognize and freely admit that 
political inquiry and politics are autonomous 
practices, quite capable of getting along with- 
out transcendental foundations and legitima- 
tions. Second, they must rethink "what theory 
is and can be in political theory." As we shall 
see, taking this cure can help theorists "come 
to grips with the question of the relationship of 
academic political theory to politics," though 
it cannot resolve this difficult problem (p. 155). 
With respect to autonomy, Gunnell's posi- 
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tion is the contextualist one that criteria defin- 
ing practices and standards of good practice 
are internal to practice; consequently, second- 
order reflection on practice, no matter how 
well performed, cannot be automatically 
authoritative (though it may be influential). 
This position means that science does not need 
metascience and that politics does not need 
metapolitics. Like science, politics has its own 
standards and theories, which may or may not 
be influenced by academics. But that most of 
what passes for political philosophy and politi- 
cal theory today could possibly affect practice, 
Gunnell very much doubts. To suppose it 
could would be to suppose that it took political 
practice as its object and that it had an audi- 
ence with which to interact. In fact, however, 
it takes philosophical objects, projects, and 
perplexities and ascribes them to politics. 
Thus, Rawls's work and the cottage industry it 
has inspired "is not about any human practice; 
it is not about any state of affairs. It is about 
concepts and logic." Similarly, MacIntyre 
assumes in After Virtue that moral relativism is 
a political rather than an academic problem, 
and that the latter is both the cause of the 
former "and the site of a solution" (pp. 176, 
179). 
What all this suggests is that political theo- 
rists should engage politics in the manner, for 
example, of that portion of the feminist litera- 
ture that confronts an "existential problem ... 
and that speaks to and for an actual audience" 
(p. 122). Such a prescription means only that 
metatheory, not substantive theory, be given 
up. Advancing substantive, constitutive, or 
ontological theory should be a primary task of 
academic political theory. 
By substantive theory Gunnell means "that 
class of claims that establishes a domain of 
facility-what exists and the manner in which 
it exists-and provides the criteria of explana- 
tion, description, evaluation, and prescrip- 
tion" (p. 143). An example of such a theory, 
one on which Gunnell has been working for 
some years, is provided in the final chapter. It 
draws on theoretical (not metatheoretical) 
claims advanced in the philosophies of action 
and language, and thus postulates ontological 
claims about social phenomena that are 
familiar features of the literature on inter- 
pretive forms of social inquiry. It just happens 
to assert the conventionality of politics, 
thereby undercutting the contrary ontological 
positions of transcendentalists while under- 
writing an interpretive form of inquiry that 
would require taking conventional politics as 
its text. 
Gunnell tries in this way to unite theory, 
inquiry, and practice. Because his (corrigible) 
theory entails the conventionality of politics, 
inquiry must proceed along interpretative 
lines. This in turn ensures that conventional 
politics will be the object of analysis, thus 
opening the possibility of practical engage- 
ment. By focusing on conventional political 
understandings and standards, the theorist just 
might find an audience interested in what he or 
she has to say. Of course efficacy is not guar- 
anteed, but the alternative is hopeless. To 
continue the quest for transcendental political 
forms and standards is a sure loser even if such 
entities could be discovered. For these would 
resolve only transcendental crises and dilem- 
mas and leave politics quite untouched. 
It is this essentially political message that 
makes Gunnell's position a compelling and 
timely one. Unfortunately, debate will focus 
on the metatheoretical, methodological, and 
theoretical claims he advances; the irony of 
this situation will be examined in great detail; 
protests aimed at his exaggerations and sting- 
ing rhetoric will be heard from many quarters; 
and the thundering political silence will 
continue. 
DANIEL R. SABIA, JR. 
University of South Carolina 
Aspects of Toleration: Philosophical Studies. 
Edited by John Horton and Susan Mendus 
(London: Methuen, 1985. ii, 180p. $29.95). 
John Stuart Mill's On Liberty has set the 
context for modern discussion of the principle 
of toleration. Aspects of Toleration: Philo- 
sophical Studies, edited by John Horton and 
Susan Mendus, is a collection of essays that 
attempt to put Mill in the context of the 300 
years that culminated in his seminal essay, to 
examine and to clarify his philosophical 
assumptions, and to link his work to contem- 
porary issues. 
The essays in the collection are reworked 
papers presented at seminars and conferences 
supported by the Morell Trust based at the 
University of York, England. All but one of the 
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